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Macroprudential regulation and bank behavior: 
Theory and evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 
 
Introduction 
In the wake of the financial crisis, countries have put a lot of emphasis to nurture 
their financial systems back to a position of soundness. Accordingly, policymakers have 
been experimenting with different policies towards improving the soundness and 
stability of their financial sector. One set of policies which has attracted the attention of 
policymakers are macroprudential policies (MPPs) (See, BIS, 2009; Caruana, 2010). Simply 
put, such policies seek to ensure systemic stability of the financial system by explicitly 
addressing the interlinkages between, and the procyclicality of the financial system (IMF, 
2012).  
In this context, the paper investigates the impact of MPPs on bank behavior. In 
particular, we develop a theoretical model which explores how two major 
macroprudential measures - an increase in risk weight on loans and an increase in 
provisions on standard loans - affect bank credit growth. Subsequently, we examine the 
testable propositions of the theoretical setup, employing quarterly data for India for the 
period 2002:1 to 2012:1.  
For this purpose, we exploit the quasi-natural experiment of the MPPs initiated 
by the Indian authorities prior to the crisis to examine their efficacy. More specifically, 
beginning December 2004, the Indian central bank undertook a series of countercyclical 
MPPs targeted at sectors of the economy which seemed in danger of over-extension. 
These measures were calibrated during the period of the crisis and thereafter in order to 
moderate the impact of the global headwinds on these sectors. 
The rest of the paper continues as follows. The following section reviews the 
relevant literature in this area. The basic framework is detailed in Section 3. 
Section 4 elaborates on the results under a Basel II-type setting. The concluding 
remarks are gathered in the final section. 
 
II. Related Literature 
The existing literature has classified MPPs into two broad categories: those 
designed to address the procyclicality of the financial system and second, those focused 
on tackling financial system interconnectedness. In essence, the former reflects an 
amplifying mechanism that operates within the financial system as well as between the 
financial system and the real economy. This mechanism, termed procyclicality, is based 
on the tendency of economic agents to become overtly optimistic in an upswing and 
thereby increase their risk exposure, and subsequently become highly risk-averse during 
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the bust phase. The latter, on the other hand, magnifies the impact of financial distress. 
This mechanism depends on risk concentration (the number and size of financial 
institutions, their substitutability, and their vulnerabilities) and systemic 
interconnectedness (the level of intra-financial system activity) and is more evident at a 
point in time (cross-sectional dimension).  
Of late, several studies have emerged that examine the efficacy of 
macroprudential policies (MPP). For example, Lim et al (2011) examine the role of MPPs 
on bank credit and finds that, under certain circumstances such policies are effective in 
moderating the procyclical behaviour of credit. Subsequently, employing quarterly data 
for several Central, Eastern and South Eastern European (CESEE) economies for the 
period 1999-2011, Vandenbussche et al. (2012) found that measures such as capital 
adequacy ratio and marginal reserve requirements did exert a dampening effect on 
house prices. Dell‟ Ariccia et al (2012) empirically investigated the impact of MPPs on 
bank credit. Their findings indicate that MPPs substantially lower the incidence of a 
credit boom and in particular, it is especially effective in containing credit booms that 
might engender a financial crisis. More recently, utilising cross-national data on 36 
countries for the period 2000-11, the IMF (2012) examined the impact of several MPPs on 
both financial and real variables. The results appear to suggest statistically significant 
effects for both capital requirements and reserve requirements on credit growth. In 
terms of real variables, the results point to the fact that limits on loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio exerts a non-negligible impact on output growth. Within a dynamic panel vector 
autoregression approach, Tovar et al (2011) finds that Latin American countries have 
successfully relied on reserve requirements to contain credit over-extension during the 
2004-11 period. Wong et al. (2011) find that LTVs played a key role in arresting 
mortgage delinquency in several Asian economies. More recently, using an extensive 
sample of over 2500 banks in 48 countries, Claessens et al (2013a) reports that MPPs are 
effective in preventing the build-up of risks, although the set of instruments having 
greater efficacy varies across emerging and advanced economies. 
Besides these cross-national analyses, there are also case studies focusing on 
specific countries and/or market segments. Jimenez et al. (2012) find that dynamic 
provisioning requirements enabled Spain to successfully tide over the credit cycle and 
avoid the contractionary impact on the real economy. Igan and Kang (2011) focus on the 
impact of debt-to-income (DTI) and LTV ratios on house price dynamics in Korea and 
offer evidence to suggest that these instruments are successful in curbing house price 
increases. Craig and Hua (2011) report that property price build-ups were significantly 
dampened by the curbs on LTV in Hong Kong. Kraft and Galac (2011) document how the 
macroprudential response by the Croatian authorities in response to strong capital flows 
mitigated the ferocity of the financial crisis on domestic banks. In a similar vein, both the 
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experiences of Estonia (Sutt et al, 2011) and Turkey (Kenc et al, 2011) do provide some 
evidence in support of the relevance of MPPs. 
The analysis connects several strands of literature. The first strand is the effect of 
MPPs on bank performance. Second, the paper contributes to the literature as to how 
ownership interacts with MPPs to affect bank credit expansion. Third, the paper is related 
to the literature on the evolution of the Indian banking sector in the post-deregulation 
era. The present paper complements these findings by focusing on the impact of several 
MPPs and comparing the response across bank ownership. 
The paper comprises of two parts. First, in the spirit of related research (Wong, 
1997; Broll et al., 2003; Kopesky and Van Hoose, 2004; Pausch and Welzel, 2012), we 
develop a theoretical model of a banking firm. Two distinguishing features of our model 
include introduction of macroprudential features. The MPPs considered include a general 
provision on standard assets – a rudiment of the dynamic provisioning framework – and 
differential risk weight on loan categories. Contextually, it might be mentioned it is 
exactly these two MPPs that were employed by the Indian policymakers. The testable 
propositions emanating from the theoretical framework therefore lend themselves to 
empirical examination.  
III. Basic Setup 
 Consider a bank with loans (denoted by L) and bonds (B) on the asset side, which 
is funded through deposits (D) and equity (E). The following assumptions set out the 
framework of the model.  
 Loans: The bank has some market power in the loan market. As is well-known, 
one key feature of the Basel III framework is the differential risk weight on loans to the 
(non-bank) private sector. We assume that the representative bank extends two 
categories of loans (L1 and L2), with r1 and r2 respectively, being the interest rate applied 
by the bank to the loans of type 1 and 2. Each loan gives the bank an end-of-period 
return of (1+rj)*Lj, with probability pj (j=1,2) or zero otherwise, with p1>p2. Type 2 loans 
have higher probability of default. For purposes of simplicity, the (inverse) demand 
schedule for loan j is rj=Rj-δjLj, such that ∂rj/∂Lj =-δj<0, with Rj and δj being positive 
parameters.  
 Deposits: The bank also has some market power in the deposit market. The 
source of this market power might stem from the bank‟s ability to segment the market 
through spatial differentiation. The supply function of deposits can be expressed as 
rD=Z+δDD (Z and δD are positive parameters) such that ∂rD/∂D=δD>0. As earlier, given the 
amount (D) of deposits contracted at the beginning of the period, the end of period cost 
to the bank equals (1+rD)*D. 
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 Bonds: In addition to loans, banks also hold a marketable financial asset 
(Government bonds); the interest rate on these bonds (i) is determined in a competitive 
financial market, where the bank is a price-taker.  
 Capital requirement: The banking sector is subject to a capital requirement, 
modeled on the lines of the Basel III Accord. Under this setup, it is assumed that Type 2 
loans receive a higher risk weight (w2) vis-à-vis Type 1 category (w1). Thus, we may write 
the capital requirement as: E≥w1*L1+ w2*L2, with w2>w1, implying that the bank cannot 
have an equity level lower than wj (j=1,2) times the volume of loans, Lj.  
 Macroprudential regulation: We model two types of macroprudential 
regulation: one related to provisions on standard loans and the other related to risk 
weights. First, we assume that a fraction θj of loan type j is not repaid, which is 
exogenously determined by business cycles.
1
 As a result, the amount of standard loans 
equals (1-θj)Lj (j=1,2), on which the bank makes a provision of qj. Second, as discussed 
earlier, we assume different risk weights on different loan categories. 
 Objective Function: The objective of the bank is to maximize the expected end 
of period income (V). This is given by expression (1), i.e.,   
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 The budget constraint is:  
BLDE                                                                                                                      (2) 
from which the amount of bonds held can be derived as a residual: B=E+D-L, which, 
upon plugging back into (1) and re-arranging yields:  
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III.1 Short-run equilibrium 
 A short-run equilibrium is defined as a situation where the bank is not able to 
adjust the equity to its desired level.  As a result, the short-run optimization problem of 
the bank is: 
                                                 
1
 Accordingly, θ can be thought of as a proxy for aggregate credit risk.  
 5 
2211
,, 21
LwLwEtosubjectVMax
DLL
                                                                          (4) 
 The resultant first-order conditions (FOCs) of the problem are: 
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where λ is the lagrange multiplier associated with the equity constraint.  
 The interest rate on deposits (rD*) is set such that the marginal cost of deposits 
(LHS of 7) equals the marginal return on bank assets (i). The bank is able to earn a profit 
margin on its deposit taking, being higher the lower is the elasticity of the deposit 
supply schedule.2  
 
III.2 Macroprudential policy effectiveness 
 We come to the main goal of the paper: to analyze the impact of a 
macroprudential policy intervention on the loan market. The result is summarized in 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: (a) In case a bank is not constrained by its equity level, the short-run 
impact of a change in the standard provisions on loans is given by ∂Lj
*/∂qj <0. 
(b) In case a bank is constrained by its equity level, the short-run impact of a change in 
the standard provisions on the loan rate is given by ∂rj
*/∂qj <0. 
 
III.3 Long-run equilibrium 
 In the long run, it seems reasonable to assume that the bank would be able to 
adjust its equity level. This process leads the banking system to attain a long-run 
equilibrium, where E is endogenous. Formally, the long-run equilibrium level of E is 
determined as E=ω1*L1+ω2*L2, where ω1 and ω2 are the internal targets for w1 and w2 
(See, for example, Estrella, 2001). 
 The long run optimization problem of the bank is given as: 
Max (L1, L2, D) V s.t. E= ω1*L1+ ω 2*L2,  
                                                 
2
 To see this, we re-arrange (7) to obtain: rD* = i /(1+δD), where 1/(1+δD) is the “mark-down” on deposits.  
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 The first order conditions for a maximum are defined by (11.1) and (11.2) on the 
loan supply, while on the deposit side, it is the same as earlier (eq. 7). Explicitly writing 
(11.1) and (11.2) yields the following expressions: 
1111111 )1()1()1()21()1(  iiqLRp                                        (11.1) 
2222222 )1()1()1()21()1(  iiqLRp                                      (11.2) 
In other words, the expected return on "standard" loans (LHS) equals the expected cost 
(RHS). The latter, in turn, comprises of two terms. The first term is the return forgone for 
the bank in the event of a default while the second term is the weighted marginal cost of 
equity.  
 
Proposition 2: (a) The long run impact on loans of a change in the risk weight ωj and an 
increase in provisions are both negative, with the magnitude of the former lower than 
that on the latter.  
 
IV. Empirical testing 
 The theoretical model provides two major testable propositions. First, the impact 
of a rise in MPPs is to moderate credit demand. Second, the impact of an increase in risk 
weight on credit growth outweighs that of an increase in provisions. We test the 
empirical validity of these propositions by employing data on Indian commercial banks.  
IV.1 The database and variables 
 We extract quarterly data for the period 2002:1-2012:1 from the Prowess 
database, a leading private think-tank in India. We start off with 205 banks. This includes 
not only commercial banks, but also regional rural banks, cooperative banks and local 
area banks. Since the MPPs introduced by the authorities were targeted for commercial 
banks, we exclude the rural, cooperative and local area banks from our sample. 
Additionally, we also delete several foreign banks which have become operative only 
recently and therefore, do not have information for an extended time span to enable a 
meaningful analysis. As a result, the final sample comprises of an unbalanced set on 77 
banks, including all state-owned banks (SOBs), 32 foreign banks and the remaining 
private, including de novo private banks.  
 From this database, we cull out information on the important liabilities and asset 
items such as deposits, equity, loans and total assets as well as major income and 
expenditure numbers. Table 1 provides a description of the variables, including summary 
statistics.  
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Table 1. Variables and summary statistics 
Variable Empirical definition Source N.Obs Mean SD. 
Bank-specific: Dependent      
Gr_Advance Log (Creditt) –Log (Creditt-1) Prowess 280 0.012 0.191 
Bank-specific: Independent      
LTA Log (Total asset) Prowess 1677 4.234 1.036 
FEE Fee income/ Total asset Prowess 1677 0.437 2.745 
CAR Capital adequacy ratio Prowess 1435 0.130 0.033 
NPLs Non-performing loans/ Total loans Prowess 1288 0.031 0.022 
MPPs      
RW_CM Coded +1 if a MPP was employed in a given 
quarter, else zero  
Based on 
Sinha (2011) 
3977 0.024 0.154 
Provisions_CM As above As above 3977 0.170 0.376 
RW_Housing As above As above 3977 0.073 0.260 
Provisions_Housing As above As above 3977 0.098 0.297 
RW_CRE As above As above 3977 0.073 0.260 
Provisions_CRE As above As above 3977 0.098 0.297 
Macroeconomic       
GDPGR Quarterly growth in GDP RBI 3977 0.019 0.071 
Ownership      
SOB Dummy=1 if a bank is state-owned, else zero Prowess 3977 0.299 0.458 
PVT Dummy=1 if a bank is private, else zero Prowess 3977 0.206 0.405 
FOR Dummy=1 if a bank is foreign, else zero Prowess 3977 0.495 0.500 
  
As it widely acknowledged, prior to the crisis, India undertook a series of MPPs to 
address potential over-extension in the financial sector. These comprised of two sets of 
measures - first, an increase in risk weights and second, an increase in provisions - and 
were targeted at three segments of the economy which were deemed to be vulnerable 
to headwinds: capital market (CM), housing (HSNG) and commercial real estate (CRE) 
(See, Sinha, 2011).3   
For purposes of MPPs, we utilize the information provided in Sinha (2011) and 
code the variable as follows. We insert a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during 
quarters in which a MPP was used and zero, otherwise. In this fashion, we allow for the 
MPP to be removed if circumstances call for it (Claessens et al., 2013). A drawback of this 
coding process is that it does not take on board the intensity in the use of the 
instrument: a 10 basis points (bps) increase or decrease in a MPP is treated in a similar 
fashion as a 100 bps increases or decrease.  
To overcome this drawback, we also employ an alternate coding methodology. In 
case there is an increase (resp., decrease) of a measure in a given quarter of upto 25 bps, 
it is coded as +1 (resp., -1). Any increase (resp., decrease) in excess of (resp., lower than) 
25 bps is coded as +2 (resp., -2). Provided there is no change in the measure during the 
quarter, it is coded as zero. In this fashion, we examine not only the MPPs per se, but 
also focus on the intensity of the impact. 
                                                 
3
 MPPs were also undertaken for „Other Retail‟ wherein the provisions were altered, although the risk weights 
were kept unchanged.  
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IV.2 Empirical strategy 
Within a multivariate framework, we employ the dynamic panel data (DPD) 
methodology to assess the effectiveness of MPPs on the risk variable, credit growth. A 
major advantage of this technique is its ability to effectively address the endogeneity 
problem of some of the independent variables. Accordingly, the reduced form 
specification for bank b at time t assumes the following form:  
tbttbttbt
tbttttbtb
gdpOWNcreditgrMPP
creditgrMPPOWNMPPcreditgrcreditgr
,161,51,4
1,321,10,
*_*
_*__

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



Z
        
The dependent credit is regressed on its lag (to check for mean reversion), a 
vector (Z) of bank-specific variables and controls for the business cycle (gdp). In 
addition, we control for bank ownership (OWN), with foreign ownership being the 
control category. The bank-level control variables include bank asset (to account for 
scale economies), ratio of fee income to total income (to account for bank‟s income 
diversification), capital adequacy ratio (as a control for bank funding structure) and 
finally, NPLs as a control for bank soundness.  
The policy variables of interest include MPPs and their interaction terms. More 
specifically, we include the regression with each of the MPPs individually. To ascertain 
whether the impact of a specific MPP varies by the intensity of the financial cycle, we also 
include the interaction term – MPP*gr_credit. A negative and significant coefficient on 
this variable would signify that MPPs are more effective in the upswing of the credit 
cycle. In addition, the inclusion of the three-way interaction term - MPP*gr_credit.*OWN 
- seeks to understand as to whether the impact of a MPP over the financial cycle differs 
across bank ownership. We estimate our results using two different sets of MPPs as 
elucidated earlier: one based on use of the instrument and the other based on intensity 
of use of the instrument. The results are set out in table 2. 
 
IV.3 Results and discussion 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) is negative. Among the bank-level controls, the coefficient on CRAR is 
positive and significant, whereas that on NPL is negative and significant.  
In terms of policy variables, the results suggest that, taken in isolation, none of 
the MPPs appear to exert any perceptible influence on credit growth. This negates 
proposition 1 that the impact of an increase in MPPs is to moderate credit demand. On 
the other hand, Proposition 2 also does not appear to stand ground: the impact of an 
increase in risk weight is not significantly different from that of an increase in provisions. 
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The fact that MPPs might not necessarily be effective is consistent with previous cross-
country evidence proffered by IMF (2012).  
The effectiveness of MPPs in curbing the severity of the credit cycle is also not 
convincing, since the coefficients on the MPPs, when interacted with the LDV, are 
positive, when significant. By way of example, the coefficient on RW_CRE*LDV (Col. 10) is 
positive and significant with a point estimate equal to 0.40. What this indicates is that in 
the upswing of the credit cycle, the effect of an increase in MPPs is to actually, raise 
credit demand. However, when considered in conjunction with bank ownership, the net 
effect is to dampen credit demand. To see this, note that although RW_CRE*LDV is 
positive, the three-way interaction term RW_CRE*LDV*d_SOB is negative and highly 
significant with a point estimate equal to -8.39. Therefore, the net effect of an increase in 
risk weights (RW) on commercial real estate (CRE) for SOBs works out to be -7.99%  
points.  
Summing up, the results provide support to the fact that although MPPs in 
isolation were not very effective in curbing credit expansion, when considered together 
with bank ownership, they played an important role in limiting overall credit growth by 
curbing credit growth for sectors that seemed in danger of over-extension.  
 
V. Concluding Observations  
 Existing research on the Basel Accord has raised the question of how revisions to 
the Accord to likely to influence the efficacy of macroprudential policy. To explore this 
issue, the paper considers a basic framework to examine the efficacy of such policy to 
influence bank lending. The findings indicate the following: the impact of an increase in 
MPPs is to moderate credit demand and second, the impact of an increase in risk weight 
on credit growth outweighs that of an increase in provisions.  
 The basic spirit of the model is empirically explored using quarterly data on 
Indian banks for 2002:1-2012:1 which subsumes the imposition of MPPs. While the 
analysis does not unequivocally support the theoretical predictions, what is of interest is 
to note is that MPPs played an important role in moderating the severity of the credit 
cycle across bank ownership. These results are observed to be robust to alternate 
definitions of MPPs and after controlling for the economic environment and bank-level 
factors.    
 The findings however, would need to be treated as preliminary. In particular, as 
indicated earlier, the lack of a comprehensive database on the relevant variables might 
hinder the robustness of the results. Second, it is possible that MPPs are effective in 
curbing loan extension to targeted sectors, which cannot be adequately examined with 
the aggregate loan data. A thorough analysis of these aspects remains an important 
element of future research. 
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Table 2. Dependent variable: Growth in advances  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lagged dependent variable (LDV) -0.373 
(0.063)*** 
-0.372 
(0.063)*** 
-0.386 
(0.074)*** 
-0.381 
(0.064)*** 
-0.373 
(0.063)*** 
-0.373 
(0.063)*** 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ownership YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
RW_Capital market 0.025  
(0.135) 
     0.025 
(0.135) 
     
 
Provisions_Capital market  -0.004 
(0.068) 
     0.121 
(0.168) 
    
RW_Housing   0.048  
(0.033) 
     0.022 
(0.033) 
   
Provisions_Housing    0.037  
(0.036) 
     0.005 
(0.036) 
  
RW_CRE     -0.014 
(0.068) 
     0.467 
(0.180)*** 
 
Provisions_CRE      -0.015 
(0.039) 
     -0.021 
(0.049) 
RW_Capital market*LDV       -0.013 
(0.024) 
     
Provisions_Capital market*LDV        -5.633 
(5.120) 
    
RW_Housing*LDV         0.424 
(0.221)** 
   
Provisions_Housing*LDV          0.455 
(0.221)** 
  
RW_CRE*LDV           0.401 
(0.0202)** 
 
Provisions_CRE*LDV            0.648 
(1.965) 
RW_Capital market*LDV*SOB       0.244 
(0.523) 
     
Provisions_Capital market*LDV*SOB        3.836 
(3.538) 
    
RW_Housing*LDV*SOB         -0.521 
(0.068)*** 
   
Provisions_Housing*LDV*SOB          -0.041 
(0.022)* 
  
RW_CRE*LDV*SOB           -8.386 
(3.768)** 
 
Provisions_CRE*LDV*SOB            -12.213 
 17 
(4.219)*** 
RW_Capital market*LDV*PVT       -0.024 
(0.244) 
     
Provisions_Capital market*LDV*PVT        2.131 
(2.004) 
    
RW_Housing*LDV*PVT         -0.027 
(0.237) 
   
Provisions_Housing*LDV*PVT          -0.044 
(0.237) 
  
RW_CRE*LDV*PVT           -32.870 
(9.735)*** 
 
Provisions_CRE*LDV*PVT            -0.788 
(2.447) 
Banks, N.Obs 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 25; 231 
Period 2002:1-
2012:1 
2002:1-
2012:1 
2002:1 - 
2012:1 
2002:1 - 
20.12:1 
2002:1 - 
2012:1 
2002:1- 
2012:1 
2002:1- 
2012:1 
2002:1-
2012:1 
2002:1 - 
2012:1 
2002:1 - 
2012:1 
2002:1 - 
2012:1 
2002:1- 
2012:1 
Diagnostics             
Sargan (p-Value) 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.20 
Difference Sargan (p-Value) 0.88 0.84 0.63 0.79 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.76 
m1, m2  0.00, 0.28 0.00, 0.24 0.00, 0.61 0.00, 0.57 0.00, 0.26 0.00, 0.17 0.00, 0.28 0.00, 0.31 0.00; 0.23 0.00, 0.25 0.00, 0.36 0.00, 0.24 
MPPs are based on use 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
